“The big joke on democracy is that it gives its mortal enemies the tools to its own destruction.”

–Joseph Goebbels

The last couple of weeks has done nothing to end my continuing fascination with Nazi Germany and HItler’s catastrophic rise to power. The fact that he got there in the context of a previously-functioning democracy was bad enough, but what is even more fascinating is how he managed to stay there despite the fact that most of the power brokers of the time thought he was a buffoon propped up by a violent mob. In Takeover: Hitler’s Final Rise to Power (Penguin Random House, 2024), historian Timothy W. Ryback chronicles the events of 1932 and shows how major players decided they could manage him to their advantage during what they were sure would be a brief interlude. Sane conservatives thought he would burn himself out, capitalists thought he would protect their money, and even radicals saw a silver lining, thinking that his excesses would push the country to the revolution they thought it needed. In their attempts to position themselves for personal and political gain, these players empowered forces they did not understand.

According to Ryback, General Kurt von Schleicher hoped that HItler’s bombastic promises might pave the way for a takeover by a real strongman, i.e. him, to pick up the pieces. He launched a “taming process” to push out the worst radicals in the Nazi Party and bring the rest closer to the political mainstream. He tried to soften Hitler’s reputation for violence, characterizing him as “a man who only wants peace.” A large section of the book is devoted to Schleicher’s various machinations, which included a plan to have the Brown Shirts crush the leftists before the German Army eliminated the Brown Shirts. His strategy had considerable support from foreign correspondents like Frederick T. Birchall of the NYT, who worked hard to reassure Americans that Hitler was in over his head and would soon be contained by other conservative leaders.

At the same time, the leftist and centrist opposition was fragmented. The Social Democrats had become a gerontocracy, with an average gap of two decades between their leaders and Hitler’s team. They were overly confident in democratic institutions and constitutional processes and hamstrung by their commitment to team leadership. The Catholics were reluctant to ally with the Social Democrats due to their fear of Communism, and Hitler used his own Catholic upbringing to convince many of them that he would protect Christianity as the basis for Germany’s moral order.

Ryback points out that HItler’s own strange character was an asset because it made him psychologically immune to criticism and ridicule. Even the Riechstag elections of November, where the National Socialists lost seats, did not discourage him. Ironically, the Nazis were saved by the maneuvering of Schleicher, who thought he could form a coalition with some elements of HItler’s base, but failed. The resulting negotiations ended with Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor, under the mistaken belief that he could be controlled. Within two years Schleicher was killed, along with several of the other players, when Hitler eliminated some of his less “reliable” lieutenants and allies in the Night of the Long Knives.

It’s hard not to see the patterns: an aging and complacent establishment, business people more concerned about profit and personal advancement than the fate of their nations, political strategists who think they can ride the dragon, and discouraged voters who turn their backs and disengage. But history still has the power to surprise us; hopefully, we can still surprise ourselves.